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This box analyses the impact that a hypothetical rise in market 
interest rates would have on the income of Spanish general 
government, non-financial corporations and households.1 For this 
purpose, a three-year horizon (2018-2020) is considered, on the 
basis of the data observed to March 2018, and a baseline scenario 
and three other alternatives – including various hypothetical 
situations involving market interest rate rises – are assessed. The 
exercises consider the impact on interest revenue and interest 
payments associated with the financial assets and liabilities, 
respectively, of the various sectors.
The baseline scenario envisages a gradual, moderate rise in market 
interest rates, in keeping with the expectations implicit in the yield 
curves. This scenario coincides with the baseline projections of the 
latest macroeconomic scenario published by the Banco de España.2 
The alternative scenarios envisage an increase in market interest 
rates – merely for illustrative purposes – of 100 bp above the levels 
of the baseline scenario. In the first such scenario, the rise is confined 
to yields up to a term of one year; in the second, to the medium- and 
long-dated segments of the curve; and in the third, the entire yield 
curve is shifted upwards. To simplify the exercise, it is assumed in 
these three scenarios that the macrofinancial variables, such as GDP 
and the volume of debt or assets, are not affected by the interest rate 
shock, such that the levels of these variables remain at the same 
values as in the baseline scenario.
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HOUSEHOLDS. FINANCIAL CHARGES AND REVENUE
SOURCES: INE and Banco de España.
a Interest paid on financing received less interest return on deposits.
1  This box is an update of Box 1.3 of the Annual Report, 2016, Banco de 
España.
2  See “Macroeconomic projections for the Spanish economy (2018-2020): 
the Banco de España’s contribution to the Eurosystem’s June 2018 joint 
forecasting exercise”.
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To simulate the impact that market interest rate rises would have on 
economic agents’ income, we estimated the behaviour of the 
fundamentals over the forecasting horizon under the various 
scenarios considered. Thus we estimated, firstly, the balances of 
certain financial assets (sight and fixed-term deposits) and liabilities 
(credit and debt securities) and, secondly, the interest rates linked 
to these instruments. Specifically, to determine the impact on the 
average return on deposits and the cost of households’ and firms’ 
outstanding loans, we used equations estimated from historical 
information that measure the habitual pass-through from market 
rates to these yields. In the case of debt securities issued by 
general government and firms, the maturity schedule for 
outstanding debt and future financing needs have been taken into 
account. Also, in new issues it was assumed that the proportion of 
short-term to long-term securities will be the same as that set by 
the Treasury for 2018, in the case of general government, and that 
observed in March 2018, in that of non-financial corporations.
Charts 1 to 3 present the results of the simulations for each of the 
three sectors analysed. For general government, given the 
predominance of long-term, fixed-rate financing, the impact of an 
interest rate rise on its net interest burden (difference between 
interest payments and interest revenue) is gradual and, 
comparatively, more marked when this rise is concentrated in the 
long-dated segment of the curve. The high inertia of interest 
payments in this sector, linked to the long duration of its liabilities, 
means that the net interest burden does not increase over the 
three-year horizon simulated under a scenario of moderately rising 
interest rates such as the baseline scenario, nor does it do so 
under the alternative scenarios. Regarding the effect of shocks, 
the results of the simulations show that a 100 bp increase in short-
term interest rates would translate into a net interest burden that 
would be 0.1 pp higher in terms of GDP than under the baseline 
scenario at the end of the forecasting horizon (end-2020), while an 
increase of the same amount in long-term interest rates would 
mean a burden 0.2 pp higher. Under a scenario in which both rates 
increase simultaneously, general government net interest 
payments would rise by 0.3 pp of GDP compared with the baseline 
scenario. These effects are substantially larger than those 
estimated some years ago before the notable rise in general 
government debt, which has raised the sensitivity of the balance 
to changes in interest rates. The size of the effect is significant 
because, as disclosed when the Banco de España’s most recent 
forecasts3 were published, the envisaged intensity of the process 
of budgetary consolidation over the period 2018-2020 is, given the 
expected favourable cyclical environment, modest.
As shown in Chart 2, the business sector’s net interest burden is 
more sensitive to increases in the short-term segment of the yield 
curve, which reflects the prevalence of financing with a near-dated 
maturity and at a floating rate. This same characteristic means that 
the pass-through of market interest rate movements to the average 
costs of outstanding balances is swifter than in the case of general 
government. Even under the baseline scenario, which, as noted 
above, envisages gradual, moderate rises in interest rates, the net 
interest burden would eventually stand above the level recorded at 
March 2018, which indicates that there is no room left now for 
lowering the average cost of financing. The simulations show that 
a 100 bp rise in short-term interest rates would result in an increase 
in the sector’s gross interest burden of 1.4 pp relative to its gross 
operating surplus (GOS) at the end of the forecasting horizon, in 
comparison with the baseline scenario. In the case of a rise in 
long-term interest rates, the net interest burden would scarcely 
increase by 5 bp. Combining the two shocks, the net impact would 
be somewhat less than 1.5 pp (i.e. approximately 0.35% of GDP). 
These effects are quantitatively high, but more moderate than 
those estimated just before the last crisis as a result of the notable 
deleveraging of this sector in recent years.
In the case of households, given the prevalence of variable-rate 
financing and the short duration of deposits, their financial 
expenses and revenue are fundamentally linked to the changes in 
short-term interest rates and practically insensitive to changes in 
the long-dated segment of the yield curve. Specifically, the impact 
associated with a 100 bp increase in short-term interest rates on 
debt interest payments is estimated at 0.6 pp of gross disposable 
income (GDI) at the end of the horizon considered (see Chart 3). 
The impact in net terms is more moderate, at somewhat less than 
0.2 pp of GDI, since, for the sector as a whole, the higher debt 
interest payments are largely offset by the increase in the return on 
the sector’s deposits (nearly 0.5 pp of GDI) (see Chart 4). As in the 
case of firms, it can be seen how, even under the scenario 
envisaging a gradual, moderate rise in interest rates (baseline 
scenario), both the gross and the net interest burden tend to rise 
over the course of the forecasting horizon, which suggests that the 
scope for further decreases in these two variables has been 
exhausted. Furthermore, and again similar to what occurred with 
firms, the notable household deleveraging in recent years, along 
with the growing trend of household deposits, has contributed to 
substantially moderating the negative income effect associated 
with interest rate rises.
In conclusion, the results of this Box show to what extent the 
income of the three sectors considered would be negatively 
affected by interest rate rises, this effect differing in each sector. In 
the case of general government, the impact is comparatively 
slower and takes place basically as a consequence of increases in 
medium- and long-term yields. By contrast, for households and 
firms the effects are much more rapid and mainly result from rises 
in short-term interest rates. Of these latter two sectors, firms are 
comparatively more affected by these shocks owing to their higher 
net debt.
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3  See “Macroeconomic projections for the Spanish economy (2018-2020): 
the Banco de España’s contribution to the Eurosystem’s June 2018 joint 
forecasting exercise”.
